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Construir até Gettysburg: 17 de junho de 1863

Construir até Gettysburg: 17 de junho de 1863


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Mapa mostrando a posição dos principais exércitos da União e Confederados em 17 de junho de 1863

Mapa retirado de Batalhas e líderes da Guerra Civil: III: Retiro de Gettysburg, p.264

Gettysburg: A Última Invasão, Allen C. Guelzo. Um excelente relato da campanha de Gettysburg, ilustrado por uma esplêndida seleção de relatos de testemunhas oculares. Concentra-se nas ações de comandantes individuais, de Meade e Lee até comandantes de regimento, com foco nos comandantes de corpo e suas atividades e atitudes. Apoiado por muitos relatos de partes inferiores da cadeia de comando e de civis envolvidos no conflito. [leia a crítica completa]

Estrelas em seus cursos: Campanha de Gettysburg, Shelby Foote, 304 páginas. Bem pesquisado e escrito por um dos historiadores mais conhecidos da Guerra Civil, este trabalho é retirado de sua obra mais longa de três volumes sobre a guerra, mas não sofre com isso.


Middleburg

A cavalaria de Jeb Stuart rastreou a infantaria confederada enquanto ela marchava para o norte, atrás das montanhas Blue Ridge. Em 17 de junho de 1863, Pleasanton enviou a 1ª Cavalaria de Rhode Island sob o comando do Coronel Alfred Duffié para Middelburg. Sem apoio, o regimento de Duffié empurrou os escaramuçadores rebeldes e entrou na cidade, mas foi então dominado pela brigada de Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson. O primeiro Rhode Island foi derrotado, causando cerca de 225 vítimas. Em 19 de junho, Stuart voltou para o Blue Ridge. A brigada do coronel J. Irvin Gregg's avançou, conduzindo a cavalaria de Robertson para terreno elevado uma milha além de Middleburg. Ambos os lados foram reforçados e montados e as escaramuças desmontadas continuaram. Os soldados ianques forçaram os homens de Stuart a saírem de sua posição, mas a cavalaria rebelde recuou novamente em direção a Upperville, ainda cobrindo as abordagens de Blue Ridge. As batalhas em Aldie, Middleburg e Upperville ao longo da Ashby's Gap Turnpike atrasaram com sucesso o avanço da cavalaria da União no Vale de Loudoun, impedindo-os de encontrar o exército de Lee.


Pickett & # 39s Charge

Após o fracasso em quebrar as linhas da União em Gettysburg, os confederados foram forçados a encerrar sua invasão do Norte e a retirar-se da Pensilvânia e recuar para a Virgínia. O exército rebelde nunca mais montaria uma grande invasão ao Norte.

Nunca ficou totalmente claro por que Lee ordenou a acusação de Pickett. Existem alguns historiadores que afirmam que a carga era apenas parte do plano de batalha de Lee naquele dia, e um ataque de cavalaria liderado pelo General J.E.B. Stuart, que não conseguiu cumprir seu objetivo, condenou o esforço da infantaria.


John Reynolds e # 8217 Recklessness Shaped Victory em Gettysburg

Abraham Lincoln se reuniu em particular com Reynolds em 2 de junho de 1863. Especula-se amplamente que o presidente lhe ofereceu o comando do Exército do Potomac e que o general recusou porque acreditava que não teria a liberdade de agir conforme necessário. Se isso é verdade, é irrelevante. A questão é que Lincoln não teria se encontrado em particular com um comandante de corpo se ele não o tivesse respeitado e valorizado sua opinião.

De modo geral, o maior teste de Reynolds veio em 1º de julho em Gettysburg. Ele esteve no campo apenas brevemente antes de ser morto, mas suas ações naquela manhã moldaram profundamente a batalha que se seguiu. A questão é se ele se mostrou à altura ou, em vez disso, demonstrou que foi superestimado e se comportou de maneira imprudente ao colocar o exército em risco.

Em 30 de junho, Reynolds foi colocado no comando da Asa Esquerda do Exército do Potomac, que incluía o 1º, 3º e 11º Corpo de exército. A atribuição refletia a confiança que o comandante do exército, major-general George G. Meade, tinha na liderança e julgamento de Reynolds. As ordens de Reynolds para 1º de julho eram para avançar o 1º Corpo de exército para Gettysburg para apoiar o Brig. Cavalaria do general John Buford. Essas ordens continham uma disposição fundamental: Reynolds tinha autoridade "sem esperar pelo inimigo ou novas ordens" para recuar em direção a Emmitsburg, Maryland, se ele achasse que a situação se justificava, mas que "sua posição atual foi dada mais com vista a um avançar em Gettysburg do que um ponto defensivo. ”

A decisão de ficar e lutar ajudou a tornar o major-general George Meade um vencedor em Gettysburg. (Buyenlarge / Getty Images)

Meade revisaria seus planos durante a noite e em 1º de julho emitiu uma circular, agora conhecida como Pipe Creek Circular, direcionando o exército para posições defensivas atrás de Pipe Creek perto de Taneytown, Maryland, se o contato fosse feito com os confederados. Por causa de um atraso imprevisto, Reynolds nunca recebeu as revisões.

Reynolds, que não esperava lutar em 1º de julho, cavalgou à frente de suas tropas para se encontrar com Buford e examinar o terreno em Gettysburg. Foi uma decisão crucial. A primeira evidência de que algo estava errado foi quando civis foram encontrados fugindo para o sul na Estrada Emmitsburg, descrevendo combates futuros.

Quando ele logo soube que os rebeldes estavam avançando em Chambersburg Pike, Reynolds correu para o Seminário Luterano, a oeste da cidade, e encontrou Buford. Não sabemos exatamente o que o cavaleiro disse ao general, mas é possível supor isso por seu relatório e despachos. Seus postos avançados estavam sendo conduzidos pela A.P. Hill’s Corps, James Longstreet’s Corps estava na retaguarda de Hill e Richard Ewell’s Corps estava ao norte de Gettysburg.

Isso significava que cerca de 60.000 rebeldes estavam se aproximando no pique, com mais 30.000 ao norte da cidade. Reynolds tinha apenas uma divisão de 3.500 homens em uma hora de marcha. O resto do 1º Corpo não chegaria antes das 11 horas da manhã, o 11º Corpo não antes do início da tarde. Ele precisava tomar uma decisão imediata.

Os pedidos de Reynolds ofereceram a ele três opções. Primeiro, ele poderia retirar Buford e o 1º Corpo de exército e concentrá-los com o 3º e o 11º Corpo acima de Emmitsburg - a opção mais segura, embora cedesse a iniciativa ao inimigo.

Em segundo lugar, ele poderia fazer com que Buford monitorasse o avanço do inimigo e posicionasse o 1º e o 11º Corpo em e ao redor da Colina do Cemitério. Este terreno elevado era o melhor terreno defensivo na área, mas colocava os Federados em risco se oprimido pela então mais forte força confederada.

Terceiro, ele poderia enfrentar os rebeldes além de Gettysburg, trocando homens por tempo. Essa era sua opção mais arriscada, mas mantinha uma tela do terreno-chave ao sul da cidade, bem como da rede de estradas que traria o resto do exército para o campo. Reynolds escolheu esta opção mais arriscada.

O monumento equestre ao General John Reynolds, comandante do Union 1st Corps, está localizado em Chambersburg Pike, a oeste de Gettysburg. (John Van Decker / Alamy Stock Photo)

Embora Reynolds pagasse com sua vida, os eventos subsequentes provaram a sabedoria de sua audácia. Ele, e não Lee, escolheu o campo de batalha, e o sacrifício do 1 ° e 11 ° Corpo de exército permitiu que o resto do exército ocupasse Cemetery Ridge, Little Round Top e Culp's Hill, dando a Meade a vantagem nos combates de 2 a 3 de julho. Se o exército tivesse seguido o plano de Pipe Creek de Meade, o sempre perigoso Lee teria recebido a iniciativa.

Reynolds, é claro, não deve ser considerado o arquiteto da vitória da União em Gettysburg. Muitos, incluindo Meade, merecem uma parte do crédito por isso. Mas em seu breve tempo no campo, o general respondeu de forma retumbante à pergunta se ele merecia a confiança e a confiança que pessoas como Meade, Lincoln e outros tinham nele e, podemos acrescentar, seu lugar na história da batalha.


20 decisões fatídicas em Gettysburg

A 9ª Bateria do Capitão John Bigelow em Massachusetts travou uma luta desesperada contra os confederados que avançavam perto do Celeiro Trostle em 2 de julho de 1863.

Por Matt Spruill
5 de agosto de 2020

Um ex-guia licenciado do campo de batalha analisa os julgamentos críticos que decidiram o resultado do confronto titânico

A Batalha de Gettysburg durou três dias horríveis, 1, 2 e 3 de julho de 1863, e transformou uma cidade em uma encruzilhada agrícola em um sinônimo internacional de conflito titânico. A luta que ocorreu nas colinas, cumes e campos agrícolas de Gettysburg, no entanto, não ocorreu como resultado do acaso. Os eventos se desenrolaram como aconteceram devido a uma série de decisões críticas feitas antes, durante e depois do engajamento pelos comandantes de ambos os exércitos e em todos os níveis. Um número seleto dessas decisões determinou a maneira como a batalha e toda a campanha se desenrolaram.

O Exército da Virgínia do Norte avançou primeiro, e o Exército do Potomac logo o seguiu. Semanas de marchas quentes e sujas levaram ambas as forças a Gettysburg. (Pintura de Paul Strain)

Gettysburg foi moldado por 20 dessas decisões críticas. Um era estratégico, três operacionais, 14 táticos e dois organizacionais. Oito foram feitos no exército, seis no corpo, três na divisão e três nos níveis de brigada. Oito foram feitos por comandantes da União, 12 por comandantes confederados. Todos foram implementados pelos milhares de soldados do Exército da Virgínia do Norte e do Exército do Potomac.

1. O Exército da Virgínia do Norte vai para o norte - Decisão Estratégica de Nível do Exército

Apesar da vitória dos confederados em Chancellorsville no início de maio, os dois exércitos ainda se enfrentaram no rio Rappahannock, assim como haviam feito após a Batalha de Fredericksburg cerca de quatro meses antes. O general Robert E. Lee tinha várias opções de campanha para o verão de 1863. Duas mantiveram o Exército da Virgínia do Norte em seu estado homônimo. Um chamou seu exército para se juntar à luta no Teatro Ocidental. Uma quarta opção enviou seu exército através do rio Potomac para o território do norte - permitindo-lhe coletar forragem e suprimentos, interromper os planos de campanha da União e talvez obter uma vantagem política com uma vitória no campo de batalha. A Batalha de Gettysburg resultou da decisão de Lee de escolher essa opção.

2. Reorganização do Exército da Virgínia do Norte - Decisão Organizacional em Nível do Exército

Desde o verão de 1862, o exército de Lee estava organizado no que era conhecido primeiro como alas, depois corpo, comandado pelo tenente Gens. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson e James Longstreet, à esquerda. Lee acreditava que o arranjo de dois corpos era grande demais para um controle efetivo, especialmente em terreno arborizado. Ferido mortal de Jackson em Chancellorsville, Lee reorganizou seu exército em três corpos de infantaria comandados por Longstreet e o tenente Gens. Richard S. Ewell, abaixo, e Ambrose P. Hill. A artilharia de reserva do exército foi dissolvida e suas baterias transferidas para o corpo de infantaria. Isso proporcionou a cada corpo cinco batalhões de artilharia e a flexibilidade de designar batalhões às divisões de infantaria ou mantê-los sob o comando do corpo. A organização da cavalaria permaneceu basicamente como antes.

A reorganização deu a Lee maior flexibilidade nas manobras e desdobramentos, mas o deixou com um grande número de comandantes inexperientes: dois dos três comandantes de corpo, quatro dos nove comandantes de divisão e nove dos 39 comandantes de brigada.

3. Reorganização da Artilharia do Exército do Potomac - Decisão Organizacional no Nível do Exército

O Exército do Potomac começou a guerra com uma organização de artilharia descentralizada e ineficiente. Havia uma reserva de artilharia do exército, mas foi reduzida após as Batalhas dos Sete Dias em junho-julho de 1862, e ainda mais descentralizada após Antietam. A decisão foi tomada para reorganizar a artilharia do exército novamente após sua implantação ineficiente nas batalhas de Fredericksburg e Chancellorsville.

Uma bateria do Exército do Potomac perfura seu campo de perfuração. Os artilheiros federais eram bem treinados e equipados, e munidos de excelente munição. Chefe do Brig de Artilharia. O general Henry J. Hunt, certo, cuidou disso.

Havia duas opções para a reorganização: atribuir toda a artilharia do exército ao nível do corpo ou designar algumas baterias ao nível do corpo e usar outras para criar uma grande reserva de artilharia. A última opção foi escolhida e 69 baterias foram organizadas em 14 brigadas de artilharia, ou batalhões. Cada corpo de infantaria recebia uma brigada de artilharia, e seu comandante se reportava diretamente ao comandante do corpo. Duas brigadas de artilharia foram designadas para o corpo de cavalaria. O general de brigada Robert O. Tyler comandou as cinco brigadas de artilharia da Reserva de Artilharia e era responsável perante o chefe de artilharia do exército, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, abaixo. Hunt reportou-se ao comandante do exército, major-general Joseph Hooker, e depois que foi substituído em 28 de junho, major-general George G. Meade.

A reorganização da artilharia eliminou muitos problemas de comando e abastecimento e forneceu uma organização flexível que poderia distribuir baterias de artilharia em uma frente ampla ou poderia concentrá-las para fogo em massa em um alvo específico. Em todos os três dias em Gettysburg, a nova organização de artilharia federal ajudou decisivamente a conter os ataques confederados.

4. A Cavalaria Confederada se Desvia - Decisão Operacional de Nível de Divisão

Comandante da cavalaria do Exército da Virgínia do Norte, major-general J.E.B. Stuart se destacou no fornecimento de inteligência, protegendo os flancos do exército e em ataques. Em 23 de junho de 1863, Lee concedeu permissão a Stuart para cavalgar ao redor do exército da União se ele não encontrasse nenhum obstáculo, cruzar o rio Potomac e proteger a direita do Corpo de exército de Ewell enquanto ele marchava para o norte. Stuart começou seu movimento em 25 de junho, mas encontrou o Union 2nd Corps perto de Haymarket, Va., Impedindo-o de se mover para o norte. Em vez de voltar atrás, ele decidiu continuar. Mas depois de encontrar mais tropas da União perto de Fairfax Court House, ele teve que se mover mais para o leste e não foi capaz de virar para o norte até chegar a Rowser’s Ford no rio Potomac. Os soldados cinzentos estariam na verdade a leste do exército da União, incapazes de proteger a direita de Ewell.

Lee ficou irritado com a ausência do comandante de cavalaria & # 8217 durante a mudança para a Pensilvânia. (& # 8220O retorno de Stuart & # 8221 por Mort Kunstler copyright 1993 Mort Kunstler Inc.)

Stuart tirou suas três melhores brigadas de cavalaria de seu exército e deixou suas duas brigadas de cavalaria restantes sem uma liderança forte. Lee estava sem reconhecimento efetivo, e o general confederado ficou surpreso quando encontrou o Exército do Potomac na Pensilvânia.

5. Buford conduz uma ação retardada - decisão operacional de nível de divisão

Brigue. A divisão de cavalaria do general John Buford foi atribuída a tarefa de realizar o reconhecimento para o Exército da frente esquerda e esquerda do Potomac, e seus soldados chegaram a Gettysburg em 30 de junho. Naquela tarde e noite, Buford, à direita, recebeu informações suficientes para acreditar que As forças confederadas estavam a oeste e ao norte de Gettysburg. Buford enviou esta informação para o comandante do 1o Corpo de exército, major-general John F. Reynolds, perto de Emmitsburg, Maryland, e para o comandante do corpo de cavalaria, major-general Alfred Pleasonton. Buford tinha várias opções. Ele poderia implantar sua cavalaria no terreno-chave a oeste de Gettysburg, nas terras altas ao sul e sudeste da cidade, ou retroceder para as vizinhanças de Emmitsburg.

Buford escolheu estabelecer posições no terreno a oeste de Gettysburg, com a intenção de atrasar o avanço dos confederados pelo maior tempo possível, enquanto os reforços de infantaria da União corriam para a cidade da encruzilhada. Esta decisão influenciaria as posições e manobras de ambos os exércitos nos próximos três dias.

Esta decisão tem uma relação simbiótica com a de Buford. Reynolds comandou o 1º Corpo e, como comandante de ala, também tinha o controle operacional do 11º e do 3º Corpo. Quando Buford o informou sobre os confederados marchando em direção a Gettysburg, Reynolds tinha três opções: ocupar uma posição defensiva perto de Emmitsburg, ocupar as terras altas ao sul e sudeste de Gettysburg ou ocupar as cordilheiras a oeste da cidade.

Gen Brig John Reynolds, mortalmente ferido no primeiro dia. (Wisconsin Veterans Museum)

Reynolds, certo, decidiu colocar seu próprio corpo em marcha e ordenou que os outros dois corpos fossem para Gettysburg. O 1º Corpo de exército chegou a tempo de assumir o controle da luta de Buford e manter as forças confederadas a oeste de Gettysburg até o final da tarde.

7. Ataques de Rodes - Decisão Tática em Nível de Divisão

Em 28 de junho, o corpo de três divisões de Ewell foi posicionado em Carlisle e York, Pensilvânia. Quando ordenou que se concentrasse na área de Cashtown-Gettysburg, ele enviou a Divisão do Major General Edward Johnson de volta ao Vale Cumberland em direção a Chambersburg, tropas lideradas pelo Maj O general Robert Rodes, abaixo, mudou-se para o sul de Carlisle, e os homens do major-general Jubal Early marcharam para sudoeste de York. Quando sua divisão estava ao norte de Gettysburg em 1º de julho, Rodes ouviu os sons da luta entre o Major General Harry Heth da Divisão do A.P. Hill e o Union 1st Corps. Ele marchou com sua divisão para o sul e implantou em Oak Ridge, pensando incorretamente que estava no flanco direito dos Federados. Rodes teve a escolha de assumir uma posição defensiva e esperar que o exército se concentrasse (como Lee havia instruído) ou atacar.

Robert Rodes (Instituto Militar da Virgínia)

Rodes, com a concordância de Ewell, desconsiderou a ordem de Lee de não provocar um engajamento geral e atacou. Depois que seu primeiro ataque falhou, Rodes lançou um segundo ataque. Os ataques trouxeram a Divisão de Early para a luta e causaram o comprometimento de uma divisão adicional do Corpo de Hill's. Embora tenham tido sucesso, quatro divisões do exército de Lee foram comprometidas prematuramente na batalha. Isso resultou em um desdobramento gradativo do restante do exército quando este chegou ao campo e impediu Lee de usar todo o poder de sua força.

8. Ewell decide não atacar Cemetery Hill - Decisão tática em nível de corpo de exército

Os ataques bem-sucedidos de Ewell's e Hill's Corps levaram o 1º e o 11º Corpo da União de volta à cidade até o Cemitério de Hill. Lee dirigiu Ewell para capturar este terreno chave, mas não para trazer um engajamento geral. A Divisão de Rodes do Corpo de Ewell já havia sofrido pesadas baixas. Duas brigadas da Divisão de Early foram enviadas para o leste para bloquear uma suposta força inimiga no York Pike, e a Divisão do Major General "Allegheny" Johnson ainda estava marchando em direção a Gettysburg. Quando Ewell pediu ajuda a A.P. Hill, Hill alegou que suas divisões não eram capazes de mais ações ofensivas naquele dia, deixando Ewell com apenas duas brigadas da Divisão de Early para um ataque a Cemetery Hill, onde os Federados já haviam estabelecido uma forte posição defensiva.

O soldado Reuben Miller da 153ª Pensilvânia sobreviveu em 1º de julho lutando em Barlow & # 8217s Knoll e foi ferido na base de Cemetery Hill em 2 de julho. Ele morreu em 1902. (Cortesia da Charles Joyce Collection.)

Ewell poderia atacar ou permanecer em posição e esperar que o resto de seu corpo se juntasse a ele - ele optou por não atacar, uma decisão que concluiu a luta em 1º de julho. Como resultado, as tropas da União continuaram ocupando e reforçando Cemetery Hill e Culp's Hill, dando a Meade uma posição forte com linhas internas e impactando as opções ofensivas de Lee para 2 de julho.

9. Meade ordena seu exército a Gettysburg - Decisão operacional em nível de exército

O major-general George Gordon Meade poderia ter chamado suas tropas de volta para uma linha defensiva em Maryland, mas em vez disso ordenou que se mudassem para o norte. (Biblioteca do Congresso)

Embora dois corpos do Exército Potomac tenham lutado em 1º de julho, não havia garantia de que Meade avançaria com seus outros cinco corpos para o campo de batalha como ele fez. Meade tinha várias outras opções de onde poderia concentrar seu exército, embora todas exigissem que os dois corpos em Gettysburg marchassem para o sul e quebrassem o contato com o exército de Lee. Esta decisão traria os dois exércitos para Gettysburg.

10. Lee decide atacar - Decisão tática em nível de exército

Embora dois corpos do Exército do Potomac tenham lutado em 1º de julho, não havia garantia de que Meade avançaria com seus outros cinco corpos para o campo de batalha como ele fez. Meade tinha várias outras opções para concentrar seu exército, embora todas exigissem que os dois corpos em Gettysburg marchassem para o sul e quebrassem o contato com o exército de Lee. Esta decisão traria os dois exércitos para Gettysburg.

11. Longstreet ordena uma contra-marcha - decisão tática em nível de corpo de exército

Lee decidiu que as duas divisões de Longstreet em campo (a Divisão do Major General George Pickett ainda não havia chegado) lançariam o ataque principal contra o flanco esquerdo do Union. Isso exigiu que as tropas de Longstreet marchassem para o sul e atacassem sem serem vistas. Durante essa marcha, no entanto, a brigada líder chegou a uma pequena crista que, se cruzada, exporia a marcha de Longstreet a uma estação de sinal da União em Little Round Top.

Longstreet & # 8217s First Corps começou sua marcha para o campo de batalha rastreado por Herr Ridge, mas quando atingiu o cume do cume, os homens estavam à vista de Little Round Top. O general ordenou que suas tropas se virassem.

Longstreet poderia continuar a marchar e ser exposta, ou contramarcar e encontrar uma nova rota. Ele ordenou que sua coluna contra-marchasse e encontrasse um terreno mais baixo para continuar o movimento para o sul. Essa decisão crítica criou um congestionamento que estendeu o tempo necessário para alcançar as posições de ataque. Isso adiou o ataque até o final da tarde, interrompeu a coordenação e a prontidão do restante do exército para se juntar ao ataque e forneceu tempo adicional para o 6º Corpo do Major General John Sedgwick chegar e reforçar o alinhamento defensivo de Meade.

12. Sickles avança - Decisão tática em nível de corpo de exército

O major-general Daniel Sickles & # 8217 movimento do 3º Corpo permanece controverso. A luta que se seguiu custou a Sickles a perna direita. (Biblioteca do Congresso)

Em 2 de julho, o 3º Corpo do Major General Daniel Sickles estava defendendo um terreno que se estendia de Little Round Top para o norte à esquerda do 2º Corpo do Major General Winfield Scott Hancock no Cemetery Ridge. Como tal, seu corpo serviu como flanco esquerdo do exército da União. Sickles, no entanto, não gostou de sua posição e voltou sua atenção para um planalto de 12 metros mais alto, 1.400 metros à sua frente, ao longo da Estrada Emmitsburg. Ele enviou Brig. Divisão do general Andrew Humphreys para a estrada de Emmitsburg, enquanto o general principal David Birney mudou-se para o oeste para assumir posições que serpenteavam de Devil’s Den, através do campo de trigo e para a estrada de Emmitsburg.

Isso deixou Sickles com um flanco direito desprotegido e seu flanco esquerdo separado do Little Round Top.

13. Longstreet ataca a esquerda do sindicato - Decisão tática em nível de corporação

Depois de completar a contramarcha, as unidades de Longstreet chegaram na extensão sul de Seminary Ridge esperando encontrar-se no flanco esquerdo do exército da União ao longo da Estrada Emmitsburg. Em vez disso, Longstreet encontrou uma força da União diretamente em sua frente, correndo de Devil’s Den através do Wheatfield até o Peach Orchard e, em seguida, ao longo da Emmitsburg Road.

O Coronel A. Van Horne Ellis liderou o 124º New York no Devil & # 8217s Den. Ele e seu major se recusaram a desmontar por motivos de segurança e foram mortos a tiros. (USAMHI)

Longstreet tinha as opções de lançar um ataque imediato à posição da União, liderado pela Divisão do Major General Lafayette McLaws e apoiado pela Divisão do Major General John Bell Hood, ou ele poderia realocar suas duas divisões para flanquear as defesas da União - para cumprir as intenções táticas de Lee naquele dia. Quando Hood apresentou um plano para mudar sua divisão mais para sudeste, Longstreet rejeitou-o e ordenou que o ataque começasse. Essa decisão garantiu um ataque em 2 de julho.

14. Lei Vai para a Artilharia, 2 de julho - Decisão Tática em Nível de Brigada

Hood implantou sua divisão de quatro brigadas em duas linhas. A Brigada de Jerome B. Robertson e a Brigada de Evander M. Law, da esquerda para a direita, formaram a primeira linha de ataque, seguida pela linha de apoio da Brigada de George T. Anderson e da Brigada de Henry L. Benning, da esquerda para a direita. Nesta configuração, a Brigada de Law não era apenas a brigada certa da Divisão de Hood, mas também de todo o Exército da Virgínia do Norte. Com todos os cinco regimentos implantados, o regimento central manobraria direto para o Big Round Top, depois para o Little Round Top. Conforme a Brigada de Law avançava, ela ficou sob fogo de artilharia da bateria do Capitão James Smith perto de Devil’s Den. Law tinha várias opções: continuar se movendo para o leste, inclinar toda a sua brigada em direção à Devil’s Den ou enviar parte de sua brigada para atacar as armas de Smith e continuar em frente com o restante de sua força.

O aglomerado de rochas ao sul de Gettysburg conhecido como Devil & # 8217s Den deixou de ser apenas uma característica geológica bizarra para se tornar um pedaço de terreno de campo de batalha em 2 de julho de 1863. ((John Van Decker / Alamy Stock Photo)

Law ordenou que seus dois regimentos de direita, o 44º Alabama e o 48º Alabama, se movessem para trás da brigada e atacassem o norte em direção à bateria Union. O que havia sido o regimento central, o 15º Alabama, estava agora na extrema direita da brigada, indo diretamente para o vale entre Big Round Top e Little Round Top, com o 47º Alabama à sua esquerda. A história da defesa épica da brigada do Coronel Strong Vincent em Little Round Top é bem conhecida, pois eles lutaram contra os alabamianos até a paralisação. Mas se os dois regimentos que Law enviara à esquerda estivessem em posição de apoiar o ataque principal em Little Round Top, a luta por esse terreno vital poderia ter sido diferente.

15. Benning segue o ataque errado, 2 de julho - Decisão tática em nível de brigada

A decisão de Law de desviar dois de seus regimentos teve outras implicações críticas. A Brigada de Benning foi implantada para apoiar o ataque de Law. Uma linha de bosques separava as duas brigadas, no entanto. Depois de passar por essa floresta ao ar livre, Benning viu tropas à sua esquerda, mas não tinha certeza de quem eram. Benning teve a opção de parar sua brigada até que ele pudesse determinar a identidade dessas tropas ou ele pudesse segui-los. Ele decidiu seguir.

As tropas eram os dois regimentos que Law havia enviado para atacar a bateria de Smith. Mas, ao segui-los, a Brigada de Benning estava agora na luta pela Devil’s Den e não em posição para reforçar o ataque ao Little Round Top.

16. Greene Permanece na Colina de Culp, 2 de julho - Decisão Tática no Nível da Brigada

Aquarela de peitorais em Culp & # 8217s Hill por Edwin Forbes

Na tarde de 2 de julho, as seis brigadas das duas divisões do 12º Corpo estavam na Colina de Culp. Um ataque da Confederação ao enfraquecido centro e centro-esquerdo da União forçou Meade a ordenar que essas duas divisões deixassem Culp’s Hill e reforçassem o ameaçado Posição do sindicato no cemitério de Ridge. Mas como Brig. A 3ª Brigada do General George S. Greene, a última a partir, estava se preparando para mover-se, Greene, à esquerda, recebeu informações de seus piquetes de que um ataque Confederado substancial estava se desenvolvendo contra sua posição. Greene tinha duas opções: seguir as ordens de Meade e marchar para fora da Colina de Culp ou permanecer na posição.

Greene desobedeceu às ordens e ocupou o ponto mais alto da colina. Com a ajuda dos remanescentes do Brig. Greene, da 1ª Divisão do Gen. James Wadsworth do 1 ° Corpo de exército, conseguiu segurar grande parte da colina até que as unidades do 12º Corpo retornassem como reforços. A determinação de Greene impediu a Divisão de "Allegheny" Johnson de capturar este terreno chave, o que teria permitido aos confederados ganhar o controle do Baltimore Pike e colocar uma grande força na retaguarda do Exército do Potomac. A decisão que garantiu o direito da União teve um grande impacto nas decisões táticas de Lee em 3 de julho.

17. Slocum decide atacar - Decisão tática em nível de corpo de exército

Na noite de 2-3 de julho, o major-general Henry W. Slocum (atuando como comandante de ala) foi informado sobre as forças confederadas próximas e ocupando partes da colina de Culp. Slocum poderia ter ordenado que suas tropas se consolidassem e formassem uma posição defensiva ao longo e a leste do Baltimore Pike ou ele poderia ordenar um contra-ataque para recuperar o terreno perdido.

Slocum decidiu contra-atacar e ordenou o comandante interino do 12º Corpo, Brig. Gen. Alpheus S. Williams para atacar na primeira luz para recapturar o terreno perdido. O ataque de Williams precedeu um ataque planejado pela divisão reforçada do General Johnson. Como resultado, Johnson ficou decididamente engajado até cerca de 10 horas. Isso impediu Lee de usar esta divisão quando desenvolveu seu plano de ataque para 3 de julho.

18. Lee continua a atacar - Decisão tática em nível de exército

Lee acreditava que poderia ter tido sucesso em 2 de julho se as três corporações de seu exército operassem de forma coordenada, e em 3 de julho ele ainda tinha as mesmas opções táticas do dia anterior.

O plano inicial de Lee para continuar os ataques em ambos os flancos da União provou ser impraticável, então ele decidiu atacar o centro da União - o que é conhecido como Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Charge ou, mais popularmente, "Pickett’s Charge". Seria o último dos ataques de Lee em Gettysburg, uma derrota total da Confederação com muitas baixas. Cada uma das divisões de Lee estivera envolvida em combates pesados ​​e sofreram graves baixas.

19. Meade Não Contra-Ataque - Decisão Tática no Nível do Exército

Os soldados da União ficaram onde caíram durante a batalha. No total, os dois lados sofreram 50.000 baixas. (Biblioteca do Congresso)

A derrota no ataque de Lee contra o centro do Union deu a Meade a oportunidade de contra-atacar ou de permanecer na defesa. Os Federados também sofreram baixas significativas em três dias de combate, e as perdas de Meade entre os comandantes mais graduados foram severas e perturbadoras da estrutura de seu exército. Além disso, Meade acabara de testemunhar o efeito que um forte fogo defensivo tinha contra um inimigo avançando em campo aberto. Ele decidiu não repetir o erro de Lee e não ordenou um contra-ataque. A decisão crítica de Meade pôs fim a todos os principais combates nas proximidades de Gettysburg.

20. Lee Decide Recuar - Decisão Operacional em Nível de Exército

Lee havia perdido aproximadamente 34 por cento de seu exército durante os três dias de combate. A munição estava baixa, sem nenhum reabastecimento disponível ao norte do Rio Potomac, a água estava se tornando escassa e sua capacidade de reabastecimento foi severamente reduzida. Lee tomou a decisão crítica de se retirar para a Virgínia. A execução dessa decisão seria a primeira etapa para encerrar a campanha.

Matt Spruill é um ex-Guia licenciado do campo de batalha de Gettysburg, que agora reside e escreve no Colorado. As decisões críticas que ele resume neste artigo podem ser totalmente exploradas em seu novo livro, Decisões em Gettysburg: As Vinte Decisões que Definiram a Batalha, 2ª Edição, publicado como parte da série mais recente da University of Tennessee Press, "Command Decisions in America’s Civil War."

Esta história apareceu na edição de agosto de 2020 da Tempos da Guerra Civil.


Gettysburg148th-209revised

Este marcador indica a localização da 148ª Infantaria da Pensilvânia no último dia de combate em Gettysburg. Localizado à esquerda da linha Union, a posição do 148º estava a menos de 300 jardas do local da Carga de Pickett.

'A tempestade da guerra'

Enquanto dezenas de alunos da Farm School lutavam para manter a união unida, o presidente da instituição, Evan Pugh, lutava para manter alunos suficientes para evitar que a nova instituição caísse no esquecimento.

A notícia que chegou à mesa de Pugh em 1861 deve ter aumentado a apreensão do jovem presidente sobre essa tarefa. O New York Agricultural College anunciou que iria fechar, pelo menos temporariamente, porque a guerra havia esgotado a maior parte de seu corpo discente. "Somos duramente pressionados, mas pretendemos sobreviver à tempestade da guerra", escreveu Pugh a seu amigo Samuel W. Johnson.

Despite the ominous clouds kicked up by the war, Pugh also saw opportunities, ones that matched his own ambition to grow the college beyond its agricultural roots. The Morrill Act, passed in 1862, granted land to universities designated by the individual states to sell to raise funds for endowments.

As Confederate troops began to plot their audacious -- or rash, depending on who is telling the story -- push into Pennsylvania in the late spring of 1863, Pugh was in the thick of a battle to win the sole land-grant designation for Penn State. Whatever time and energy Pugh had left over from the day-to-day running of a college teetering on the thin line between transformation and failure, was spent lobbying legislators. Other colleges and institutions also were lobbying for sole possession or a portion of the land-grant funds. Although claims and counter-claims would roil the Capitol and continue to dog Pugh months later, the state legislature officially designated Penn State the Commonwealth's sole land-grant institution in April 1863.

"Pugh had dual stresses in 1863," University historian Michael Bezilla explained. "On one hand he was trying to position the school to receive the land-grant designation and on the other hand, he was struggling to keep as many students as possible and hold the school together."

The march north

As Gen. Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia marched north, war fever and war fears spread throughout Pennsylvania and into the Farm School. Lincoln and Pennsylvania Gov. Andrew Curtin called for 50,000 volunteers from the state. Students, often without consent from their parents or from school officials, left to join the hastily formed militias.

Meanwhile, Pugh faced an assault of a different sort. Dozens of worried parents bombarded him with letters, many of them angry that he did not do enough to stop their sons from joining the militia. Despite the loss of students and the increased tension with parents, Pugh vowed to press on.

"We are going on as usual though with very diminished numbers," Pugh wrote to Hugh McAllister. "I feel annoyed that I did not more preemptorily strive to hush up the wild and foolish excitement that took away so many students and yet gave so few efficient soldiers to the army and these without consent of parents."

Meeting at a crossroads town

The battle of Gettysburg had less to do with the Confederate Army's hunt for shoes -- a common explanation of why the two armies decided to fight it out in the southeastern Pennsylvania community -- and more to do with the town's position as a transportation hub in the mid-1800s, according to Carol Reardon, George Winfree Professor of American History at Penn State. The town was at the center of several roads, or pikes, as well as a rail line, that connected to the cities of Baltimore, Washington D.C., Philadelphia and Harrisburg.

By late June of 1863, those pikes streamed with men and material from both the Union and Confederate armies. The flashpoint occurred on the morning of July 1, just to the northwest of Gettysburg, when lead elements of the Confederate invasion force clashed with a group of Union infantry and cavalry. After a spirited defense, the Union troops withdrew to the high ground along Cemetery Ridge.

On July 2, 1863, Postmaster Forster, now a captain of the 148th's Company C, and his fellow soldiers, including several former Farm School students, were positioned near the Union's vulnerable left flank in a wheatfield that would be transformed into, as Reardon describes it, "a horrific no-man's land covered thickly with the dead and wounded from both armies."

Somewhere across the fields of the curved fishhook that formed the Union defenses, in all likelihood, Farm School students were fighting for Lee's Army. After leaving the Farm School, William McAllister had enlisted in the 27th Virginia, part of the vaunted Stonewall Brigade. His unit, though, was then transferred into the artillery. According to his records, McAllister may have served with his unit, Carpenter's Battery, during the battle of Gettysburg. The battery trained its guns on Cemetery Hill, a position close to the formidable defenses that the Union had carved into its right flank on Culp's Hill, and Union gunners carefully trained their more plentiful, more accurate cannons on McAllister's unit.

"If McAllister was there, he would have served through a nasty artillery duel on Benner's Hill about 4 p.m. on July 2," Reardon said.

Mordecai Lewis, who quickly rose up the ranks to First Sergeant of Company C in the 2nd Virginia Infantry, one of the regiments that made up of the Stonewall Brigade, was not far from McAllister's battery. His records indicate he was with his unit when it fought in Gettysburg. If so, he would have been part of the repeated Confederate attempts to dislodge Union defenders on Culp's Hill.

According to records, McAllister and Lewis likely made it through the carnage at Gettysburg unscathed, and both survived the war.

Forster was not so lucky. The captain was listed as one of the many casualties during the bloody fighting in the Wheatfield on July 2. While Union commander George Meade oversaw a textbook defense during the three-day battle, a subordinate, Gen. Daniel Sickles, committed one of the Union army's biggest blunders. Disobeying orders, Sickles moved his troops off high ground along the southern part of Cemetery Ridge and into a field of just-ripening wheat. The position was not linked with other Union defenses and the Confederates, noticing the exposed troops and the break in the Union line, quickly seized the advantage, pouring troops across the field. Meade countered by bringing reinforcements to shore up Sickles' line.

A nearly daylong series of charges and counter-charges ensued. While leading one of those charges to maintain the Union position, Forster was shot in the head. He was initially buried near the remains of Confederate Gen. William Barksdale on a Gettysburg farm. Forster's brother-in-law later retrieved the captain's remains and re-interred them in Centre County's Spring Creek Presbyterian Cemetery.

The aftermath

While Pugh struggled to stop students from leaving the school to fight in the war, he also considered joining the Army. Pugh wrote in a letter to Johnson, "Prof. Wilson and myself have been helping to raise a military company at Boalsburg. He is elected captain and will go if called upon. I would have gone if I could have left. Walker, Buner, Stoner, and Rich have gone." He added, with uncharacteristic venom, "I would leave my quakerism at home till we could give those traitor scoundrels such a thundering thrashing as no people ever got before."

Instead, Pugh fought the war by wielding a pen to write letters, campaigning endlessly for the Farm School in Harrisburg and enduring batteries of meetings with government officials and bureaucrats to shore up its land-grant status. Pugh, though, had an almost prophetic belief that while the war would be won on battlefields, the peace and the reconstruction that would follow would be won on the campuses of universities like Penn State.

He would not live to see that peace. Months after the battle of Gettysburg, Pugh was injured when he was thrown from a carriage. Those injuries -- as well as the exhaustive schedule he kept -- weakened him considerably and, although only 36 years old, he could not fight off a case of typhus. He died on April 29, 1864.

Less than a year later, Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse, essentially ending the war. Lincoln was assassinated on April 14, 1865.

A long and painful reconstruction began for both the country and the University.

Hugh McAllister, Pugh's ally in the fight to hold the school together during the University's darkest days, had a personal reconstruction to effect. His two estranged brothers -- Robert and Thompson -- had not spoken since the beginning of the war. An ailing Thompson, who fought for the Confederacy, traveled to New York to visit with a doctor. Hugh brought Robert to visit his brother and the reunion reportedly went well. The brothers, though, would never meet again. Shortly after Thompson returned from the reunion, he died peacefully in his sleep.

Many of the students who went off to war returned to graduate from the Farm School and, along with each successive class of students, helped broaden the college from its purely agricultural roots into a world-class leader in higher education. Just as Lincoln's vision for a united, free country survived his death, so did Pugh's vision for a transformed University. Penn State would play a critical role in educating not just the next generations of farmers, but also the next generations of engineers, poets, physicists and other experts from a wide-spectrum of disciplines and fields.


Military Artifacts

Wm. Stanley Ray, Harrsisburg, PA, 1904. 3/4 Leather and Marbled Boards. Revised Edition. Illustrated with plates of monuments, detailed lists of army divisions, charts of casualties, summary of casualties, strenght & losses of Pennsylvania Troops at Gettysburg, statistics on the brigades, maps and more.  In very fine condition in original publishers 3/4 calf over marbled boards, all edges gilt. A valuable reference concerning Pennsylvania troops on their own soil in the greatest battle. Presentation slip laid tipped in both volumes: "Compliments of R. B. Ricketts."  Ricketts distinguished himself as an artillery officer in the Civil War (Battery F, Penn. Light Artillery), and is best known for his battery’s defense against a Confederate attack on Cemetery Hill the 2nd day of the Battle of Gettysburg! There are some sticker remains on the front board, some on the spine,  and a library slip in the rear, some rubbing to volume edges and corners otherwise a very nice and attractive book not usually found in such clean condition. A great refernce with a truly legendary Signature. Boa sorte! More about Ricketts below:

Robert Bruce Ricketts distinguished himself as an artillery officer in the American Civil War. He is best known for his battery’s defense against a Confederate attack on Cemetery Hill on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg.

Elijah Ricketts was a merchant and farmer in Orangeville in Columbia County, Pennsylvania. He married Margaret Leigh Lockart (1810�) in 1830. Robert Bruce Ricketts was the fifth of nine children of this union, and the fifth son, born on April 29, 1839. An older brother, William Wallace Ricketts (b. 1837), attended the United States Military Academy but he died in 1862. Bruce Ricketts was educated at the Wyoming Seminary near Wilkes-Barre. When the war broke out, he was studying law and considering the possibility of a university education.

The First Pennsylvania Light Artillery (otherwise known as the 43rd Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers) was organized in 1861. The regiment left for Washington, D. C. in August of that year. Battery F was formed under Capt Ezra W. Matthews. Bruce Ricketts joined the service on July 8, as a private of that year, and he was commissioned as first lieutenant in that battery about a month later. The regiment was split, up with individual batteries serving with different divisions of the Army of the Potomac. Battery F first saw combat at the Battle of Dranesville on December 20, 1861. Ricketts’ section had one gun disabled in that action. Later the section served in the defense of Hancock, Maryland against a foray by Stonewall Jackson.

Battery F served in the Army of Virginia in the corps of Major General Irwin McDowell, joining it on March 21, 1862 at Warrenton, Virginia. In that context it was involved, under Ricketts’ leadership, in a reconnaissance expedition to Rappahannock Station, Virginia, that left on April 7, of that year. This force advanced and then withdrew, having accomplished its information-gathering purpose. Thereafter the battery was involved in the campaign culminating in the Second Battle of Bull Run. Battery F was seriously engaged in the Battle of Cedar Mountain on August 8, helping McDowell cover the retreat of the corps of Major General Nathaniel Banks. The battery helped defend Henry House Hill at Second Bull Run, and it was present at the Battle of Chantilly though not engaged. It also participated in the “artillery hell” of the Battle of Antietam. Lt Ricketts missed most of these actions while serving on recruiting duty. He returned to the Army of the Potomac on September 23, 1862.

Ricketts commanded Battery F, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery from then on until the summer of 1864. Capt Matthews went down ill and did not return to battery command. Lt Ricketts was engaged with his guns at the Battle of Fredericksburg, serving with second division I Corps under Major General John F. Reynolds. When Capt Matthews was promoted to the rank of major, Ricketts became a captain on March 14, 1863. At the Battle of Chancellorsville Capt Ricketts’ battery was with Major General Abner Doubleday’s third division I Corps.

Ricketts’ battery was - beginning on May 13, 1863 - in the third volunteer brigade of the Reserve Artillery under Captain James F. Huntington. Battery G, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, was attached to Ricketts’ battery a few weeks before the Battle of Gettysburg, on June 1, 1863. This merger was resented until gunners from Battery G were permitted to form a section of the consolidated battery. This merger took place while the army was marching north in pursuit of the Army of Northern Virginia, beginning on May 15.

Ricketts’ battery arrived in Gettysburg on the Taneytown Road on the morning of July 2, 1863 and replaced Capt James H. Cooper's Battery B, First Pennsylvania Light Artillery, on East Cemetery Hill about 4:00 PM. It was exposed to enfilade fire from Benner’s Hill and Seminary Ridge. Around nightfall, two Confederate brigades from the division of Major General Jubal Early attacked the hill. It broke the thin Union front line at the foot of the hill in two places. In other places they were repelled. Some Confederates reached the top of the hill, and one group attacked the left of Ricketts’ battery, trying to spike the guns. The fight for the guns became hand to hand, but the Confederates were unable to capture the whole battery. Eventually Union reinforcements from the II Corps brigade of Col Samuel S. Carroll drove the Confederates down hill. A monument to the battery stands in the general location of their fight.[1]

After the battle, Ricketts criticized Adelbert Ames' division of XI Corps, although he probably could not see what was going on down there at the foot of the hill.[2] He thought they fled unnecessarily. Ricketts’ account of the action makes it look as if his battery stood alone for an extended time.[3] However, a less colorful account by a modern historian shows that some of the XI Corps troops had rallied and stood fast atop Cemetery Hill even before reinforcements from Col Samuel S. Carroll’s brigade of II Corps came up behind Ricketts’ position.[4]

After Gettysburg, Ricketts’ battery F was transferred to the artillery brigade of II Corps in time for the Bristoe Campaign. At the Second Battle of Auburn on October 14, 1863, the battery helped first division II Corps cover the withdrawal of the corps under harassing fire from horse artillery of Major General J. E. B. Stuart’s command.[5] At the Battle of Bristoe Station later that day, Ricketts’ battery F came up at a gallop and unlimbered behind BG Alexander S. Webb’s second division II Corps. Their fire helped defeat Major General Henry Heth’s attack on the federal line.[6] The battery was given the privilege of presenting captured Confederate guns to Major General George G. Meade, the commanding general.

Ricketts’ battery remained with the II Corps for the Overland Campaign. During the Battle of the Wilderness, a section of Ricketts’ battery advanced on the Plank Road with Major General Winfield Scott Hancock’s attack on the Confederate lines on May 5, 1864 at about 3:30 PM. The section accompanied BG George Getty’s division of VI Corps, serving with Hancock at that time. A Confederate counterattack captured the section, but Col Samuel S. Carroll’s brigade recaptured the guns by 6:00 PM.[7] BG Getty praised Ricketts for his "great coolness and courage" in this action.[8]

Ricketts was engaged in support of Grant's offensive attacks on the Confederate positions in the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House on May 18, 1864, being moved up close to the captured Confederate works.[9] He also supported Hancock's attack on Henagan's redoubt at the Battle of North Anna on May 23.[10] The battery remained with II Corps throughout the remainder of the campaign, except at the Battle of Cold Harbor, when it was detached to serve with XVIII Corps on June 3,.[11]

Ricketts' battery crossed the James River with II Corps and participated in the Second Battle of Petersburg. Battery F fired some of the first federal shots into the beleaguered city. Ricketts' guns were on the battle front for two weeks until they were relieved by a battery from V Corps.[12]

During the subsequent Siege of Petersburg, Capt Ricketts was promoted to higher ranks in the First Pennsylvania Light Artillery. When Major James H. Cooper reached the expiration of his term of service on August 8, 1864, Ricketts was named his successor. When, in 1865, Colonel R. M. West was commissioned colonel of the Fifth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Major Ricketts was promoted to the rank of colonel in his place to date from March 15.[13]

During the early stages of the siege, Ricketts continued in command of his battery with II Corps. This included a role supporting BG Gershom Mott's division in the Second Battle of Deep Bottom.[14] After returning to the Petersburg front, the battery was assigned to positions near the Jerusalem Plank Road. During this period, Captain Ricketts presided over a court of inquiry into the loss of a gun at the Second Battle of Ream's Station. He also served on a board deciding which units could add the names of particular battles to their flags.[15] In December 1864, Cpt Ricketts, as "acting major," commanded the II Corps batteries serving on the lines of IX Corps for a period of three weeks.[16]

In 1865, Ricketts played a role in the Artillery Reserve and, by the spring of 1865 he was assistant chief of artillery of IX Corps. Whenever the chief of artillery, Colonel John C. Tidball, was absent, Ricketts took charge of the guns of IX Corps in his place.[17]

The report that a Confederate veteran looked at Ricketts, a slight man, and commented, "And did this little cuss command Battery Hell!," may be apocryphal.[18]

After the war, Colonel Ricketts, with his father and an uncle, began buying timber land in Columbia, Luzerne and Sullivan counties. By 1873, they had ca. 66,000 acres (270 km2). In 1872 Ricketts and partners opened a saw mill. He used his own lumber to build North Mountain House at Ganoga Lake in the area where he had his timber lands. The house took guests until 1903, when it became his family’s summer home. Ricketts’ interests suffered financial hardship in the years 1883 to 1885, and he had to sell off much of his land.

Col Ricketts married Elizabeth Reynolds in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania on October 1, 1868. They had three children: William Reynolds (1869�) Jean Holberton (1873�), and Frances Leigh (1881�). Lakes Jean and Leigh are named for their two daughters.

Ricketts belonged to the Grand Army of the Republic and the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States. The colonel was politically active too. He supported Major General Winfield Scott Hancock for president in 1880.[19]

At his death on November 14, 1918, at Ganoga Lake, Ricketts still owned about 80,000 acres (320 km2) around Red Rock Mountain, including Ganoga Lake (or Long Pond) and Lake Jean. Columbia, Luzerne & Sullivan Counties. Col Ricketts was buried nearby.[1] His heirs sold much of this timber land to the state of Pennsylvania via the Central Penn Lumber Company 1920-1924. This land became the nucleus of Ricketts Glen State Park.


How the Battle of Gettysburg Worked

o Batalha de Gettysburg was perhaps the most famous battle of the Civil War. You've probably heard more about this battle than any other of the war, whether you watched the Civil War TV documentary by Ken Burns, read one of the thousands of books analyzing it or simply spent a week reviewing it in school.

The battle lasted for three days in July 1863 and resulted in 50,000 casualties -- and a resounding victory for the North. The war would last for nearly two more years, but many historians cite Gettysburg as the beginning of the end for the Confederacy. The superstar of the Confederacy, Gen. Robert E. Lee, led his troops to defeat by the North, which was commanded by the relative unknown George Meade. (Ulysses S. Grant, sometimes mistakenly believed to be at the battle because he is considered Lee's Union counterpart, was entrenched in a siege in Mississippi at the time.) So how did Meade outsmart Lee, something that few Union generals had been able to do?

­While there are plenty of theories and conflicting reports about how the Battle of Gettysburg was fought and won, there is little doubt that the battle in that Pennsylvania town had a profound impact on this country. It is a part of the American psyche, even if many people can't remember who won, much less exactly who fought in it.

But why was the Battle of Gettysburg so important, and why is it considered the turning point of the Civil War? In this article, we'll explore the people involved in the Battle of Gettysburg, as well as the controversies surrounding many of their legacies. Plus, we'll find out why the battle started because of shoes.


Robert E. Lee & Gettysburg: How the Confederacy Lost

Robert E Lee’s Gettysburg Campaign ended in the Union claiming victory after three days of battle with Lee’s army. Both parties suffered major losses of life.

Robert E Lee Gettysburg Campaign

With Ewell engaged, Lee changed his mind and decided to attack the center of the Union line. The evening before, Union Major General John Newton, Reynolds’s replacement as commander of the First Corps, had told Meade that he should be concerned about a flanking movement by Lee, who would not be “fool enough” to frontally attack the Union army in the strong position into which the first two days’ fighting had consolidated it. Around midnight Meade told Brigadier General John Gibbon that if Lee went on the offensive the next day, he would attack Gibbon’s Second Division of the Second Corps in the center of the Union line. Gibbon replied that if Lee did so, he would be defeated.

Lee, however, saw things differently. Again ignoring the advice and pleas of Longstreet, Lee canceled Longstreet’s early morning orders for a flank attack and instead ordered the suicidal assault known as Pickett’s Charge.144 After studying the ground over which the attack would occur, Longstreet said to Lee, “The 15,000 men who could make a successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle.” Longstreet was not alone in his bleak assessment of the chances for success. Brigadier General Ambrose “Rans” Wright said there would be no difficulty reaching Cemetery Ridge but that staying there was another matter because the “whole Yankee army is there in a bunch.” On the morning of the third, Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox told his fellow brigadier Richard Garnett that the Union position was twice as strong as Gaines’s Mill at the Seven Days’ Battles.

Edward Porter Alexander shared the complete, almost blind, faith of the Confederate troops in Lee, later remarking, “ . . . like all the rest of the army I believed that it would come out right, because Gen. Lee had planned it.” But historian Bevin Alexander has severely criticized Lee’s order: “When his direct efforts to knock aside the Union forces failed, Lee compounded his error by destroying the last offensive power of the Army of Northern Virginia in Pickett’s charge across nearly a mile of open, bullet-and-shell-torn ground. This frontal assault was doomed before it started.”

The famous attack was preceded by a massive artillery exchange—so violent and loud that it was heard 140 miles away. Just after one o’clock, Alexander unleashed his 170 rebel cannon against the Union forces on Cemetery Ridge. Two hundred Federal cannon responded. Across a mile of slightly rolling fields, the opposing cannons blasted away for ninety minutes. The Confederate goal was to soften up the Union line, particularly to weaken its defensive artillery capacity, prior to a massive assault on the center of that line. Some Federal batteries were hit, as were horses and caissons on the reverse slope near Meade’s headquarters.

Alexander’s cannonade continued until his supply of ammunition was dangerously low. A slowdown in the Union artillery response gave a false impression that the Confederate cannonade had inflicted serious damage. Although Alexander received some artillery assistance from Hill’s guns to the north, Ewell’s five artillery battalions northeast of the main Confederate line fired almost no rounds. Artillery fire was one thing that Ewell could have provided, but the commanding general and his chief of artillery also failed to coordinate this facet of the offensive.

The time of decision and death was at hand for many of the fifty-five thousand Confederates and seventy-five thousand Yankees. The rebels were about to assault a position that Alexander described as “almost as badly chosen as it was possible to be.” His rationale:

Briefly described, the point we attacked is upon the long shank of the fishhook of the enemy’s position, & our advance was exposed to the fire of the whole length of that shank some two miles. Not only that, that shank is not perfectly straight, but it bends forward at the Round Top end, so that rifled guns there, in secure position, could & did enfilade the assaulting lines. Now add that the advance must be over 1,400 yards of open ground, none of it sheltered from fire, & very little from view, & without a single position for artillery where a battery could get its horses & caissons undercover.

I think any military engineer would, instead, select to attack the bend of the fishhook just west of Gettysburg.

There, at least, the assaulting lines cannot be enfiladed, and, on the other hand, the places selected for assault may be enfiladed, & upon shorter ranges than any other parts of the Federal lines. Again there the assaulting column will only be exposed to the fire of the front less than half, even if over one fourth, of the firing front upon the shank.

Around 2:30, Alexander ordered a cease-fire and sent a hurried note to General Longstreet: “If you are coming at all, you must come at once or I cannot give you proper support, but the enemy’s fire has not slackened at all. At least 18 guns are still firing from the cemetery itself.” Longstreet, convinced of the impending disaster, could not bring himself to give a verbal attack order to Major General George E. Pickett. Instead, he merely nodded his permission to proceed after Pickett asked him, “General, shall I advance?”

On the hidden western slopes of Seminary Ridge, nine brigades of thirteen thousand men began forming two mile-and-a-half-long lines for the assault on Cemetery Ridge. Their three division commanders were Pickett, Major General Isaac Trimble (in place of the wounded Dorsey Pender), and Brigadier General J. Johnston Pettigrew (in place of the wounded Henry Heth). Pickett gave the order, “Up men, and to your posts! Don’t forget today that you are from old Virginia!” With that, they moved out.

After sending his “come at once” message, Alexander noticed a distinct pause in the firing from the cemetery and then clearly observed the withdrawal of artillery from that planned point of attack. Ten minutes after his earlier message and while Longstreet was silently assenting to the attack, Alexander sent another urgent note: “For God’s sake come quick. The 18 guns are gone. Come quick or I can’t support you.” To Alexander’s chagrin, however, the Union chief of artillery, Henry J. Hunt, moved five replacement batteries into the crucial center of the line. What Alexander did not yet know was that the Union firing had virtually ceased in order to save ammunition to repel the coming attack and to bring up fresh guns from the artillery reserve. Hunt had seventy-seven short-range guns in the position the rebels intended to attack, as well as numerous other guns, including long-range rifled artillery, along the line capable of raking an attacking army.

The rebel lines opened ranks to pass their now-quiet batteries and swept on into the shallow valley between the two famous ridges. A gasp arose from Cemetery Ridge as the two long gray lines, a hundred fifty yards apart, came into sight. It was three o’clock, the hottest time of a scorching day, and forty thousand Union soldiers were in position directly to contest the hopeless Confederate assault. Many defenders were sheltered by stone walls or wooden fences. Their awe at the impressive parade coming their way must have been mixed with an understandable fear of battle and confidence in the strength of their numbers and position.

As the charging rebels approached the stronghold on Cemetery Ridge, their fear grew and their confidence waned with every step. The forty-seven regiments (including nineteen from Virginia and fourteen from North Carolina) initially traversed the undulating landscape in absolute silence except for the clunking of their wooden canteens. Although a couple of swales provided temporary shelter from most of the Union rifle fire, the Confederates were under constant observation from Little Round Top to the southeast. Long-range artillery fire began tearing holes in the Confederate lines. The attackers turned slightly left to cross the Emmitsburg Pike and found themselves in the middle of a Union semi-circle of rifles and cannon. They attempted to maintain their perfect parade order, but all hell broke loose when short-range round shot from Federal cannon exploded along the entire ridgeline—from Cemetery Hill on the north to Little Round Top on the south.

Minié balls and double loads of canister (pieces of iron) decimated the Confederate front ranks. The slaughter was indescribably horrible, but the courageous rebels closed ranks and marched on. Taking tremendous losses, they started up the final rise toward the copse that was their goal, all the while viciously assaulted from the front, from both flanks, and even from their rear. The rifle fire from Brigadier General George J. Stannard’s advanced Vermont brigade, shot point-blank into the rebel right flank, was especially devastating. Soon the numbers of the attackers dwindled to insignificance. The survivors let loose their rebel yell and charged the trees near the center of Cemetery Ridge. With cries of “Fredericksburg,” the men in blue cut down the remaining attackers with canister and Minié balls. General Lewis Armistead led 150 men in the final surge across the low stone wall, where he fell mortally wounded. The rest were killed, wounded, or captured within minutes.

Seventeen hundred yards away, Lee watched his gray and butternut troops disappear into the all-engulfing smoke on the ridge and then saw some of them emerge in retreat. Fewer than seven thousand of the original thirteen thousand returned to Seminary Ridge. There was no covering fire from Alexander’s cannon because he was saving his precious ammunition to repel the expected counterattack. As the survivors returned to Confederate lines, Lee met them and sobbed, “It’s all my fault this time.” Era.

Lee and Longstreet tried to console Pickett, who was distraught over the slaughter of his men. Lee told him that their gallantry had earned them a place in history, but Pickett responded: “All the glory in the world could never atone for the widows and orphans this day has made.” To his death, Pickett blamed Lee for the “massacre” of his division.

The result of Lee’s Day Three strategy was the worst single-charge slaughter of the whole bloody war, with the possible exception of John Bell Hood’s suicidal charge at Franklin, Tennessee, the following year. The Confederates suffered 7,500 casualties to the Union’s 1,500. More than a thousand of those rebel casualties were killed—all in a thirty-minute bloodbath. Brigadier General Richard Garnett, whose five Virginia regiments led the assault, was killed, and 950 of his 1,450 men were killed or wounded. Three regiments—the Thirteenth and Forty-Seventh North Carolina and the Eighteenth Virginia—were virtually wiped out on Cemetery Ridge.

That night Lee rode alone among his troops. At one point he met Brigadier General John D. Imboden, who remarked, “General, this has been a hard day on you.” Lee responded, “Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us.” He went on to praise Pettigrew’s and Pickett’s men and then made this puzzling statement: “If they had been supported as they were to have been—but for some reason not fully explained to me were not—we would have held the position and the day would have been ours. Too bad. Too bad. Oh, too bad.” General Alexander found that comment inexplicable since Lee was the commanding general and had personally overseen the entire preparation for and execution of the disastrous charge.

Even if Lee was nonplussed, his officers had little difficulty seeing the folly of Pickett’s Charge and its similarity to the senseless Union charges at Fredericksburg the previous December. Having lost over half his own 10,500 men in the July 3 charge, Pickett submitted a battle report highly critical of that assault—and probably of the commander who ordered it. Lee declined to accept the report and ordered it rewritten. It never was.

The only saving grace for Lee’s battered army was that General Meade, believing his mission was to not lose rather than to win, failed to follow up his victory with an immediate infantry counterattack on the stunned and disorganized Confederates. To Lincoln’s chagrin, Meade developed a case of the “slows” reminiscent of McClellan after Antietam and took nine days to pursue and catch Lee, who was burdened by a seventeen-mile ambulance train. Unlike McClellan’s army at Antietam, however, Meade’s entire army had been engaged and battered in the fight at Gettysburg. After missing his chance for a quick and decisive strike, Meade wisely did not attack Lee’s strongly entrenched position at Williamsport, Maryland, on the Potomac River after Meade had caught up with him. As the Confederates waited to cross, Confederate officers hoped for a Union assault: “Now we have Meade where we want him. If he attacks us here, we will pay him back for Gettysburg. But the Old Fox is too cunning.” Alexander recalled, “ . . . Oh! how we all did wish that the enemy would come out in the open & attack us, as we had done them at Gettysburg. But they had had their lesson, in that sort of game, at Fredbg. [Fredericksburg] & did not care for another.” Lee’s army crossed the receding river and returned ignominiously to Virginia.

Would you like to learn the complete history of the Civil War? Click here for our podcast series Key Battles of the Civil War


Gettysburg Address

Definition and Summary of the Gettysburg Address
Definition and Summary: The Gettysburg Address was a short speech given on November, 19, 1863 by President Abraham Lincoln at the dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. The Gettysburg Address was delivered in the height of the American Civil War to commemorate the massive numbers of deaths and casualties at the bloody Battle of Gettysburg that was fought July 1 3, 1863.

Gettysburg Address for kids
Abraham Lincoln was the 16th American President who served in office from March 4, 1861 to April 15, 1865. One of the important events during his presidency was the Gettysburg Address.

The Gettysburg Address for kids: A Two Minute Speech
The Gettysburg Address is one of the most famous speeches in the world. Yet it only took President Lincoln just over 2 minutes to deliver the Gettysburg Address. Find out facts and information about the Gettysburg Address starting with the Gettysburg Address Text, together with the meaning of the speech.

Facts about the Gettysburg Address for kids
The following fact sheet provides interesting facts about the Gettysburg Address.

President Abraham Lincoln: Gettysburg Address Fact Sheet for kids

Facts for Kids: Facts and Information

Fato 1: The text of the Gettysburg Address is carved into stone on the south wall of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.,

Fact 2 : There are approx 270 words in the Gettysburg Address and it took just over 2 minutes to deliver

Fact 3 : The reason for the speech was the dedication of the national cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

Fact 4 : When was the Gettysburg Address? The speech was given by President Abraham Lincoln on November, 19, 1863

Fact 5 : Who wrote the Gettysburg Address? Abraham Lincoln

Fact 6 : What is the Gettysburg Address? The name of a world famous speech delivered by Abraham Lincoln to honor those who had died at the Battle of Gettysburg during which Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his forces were defeated by Union forces led by General George Meade.

Fact 7 : The Civil War was at its height when the speech was made, and less than six moths after the Battle of Gettysburg (June 27 July 4, 1863). There were approximately 94,000 Union soldiers and 72,000 Confederates who fought at Gettysburg

Fact 8 : The speech was made in honor of the Union troops who had fallen on the battlefield - 3,155 soldiers were killed and 14,531 wounded fighting for the Union. (a further 4,708 killed soldiers were killed and 12,693 wounded fighting for the Confederacy)

Fact 9 : The speech reflected the ideals and principles of equality, freedom and democracy and made reference to the past, present and future of the nation

Fact 10 : The speech followed the Emancipation Proclamation which was made on January 1, 1863

Facts for Kids : Facts and Information : Gettysburg Address Fact Sheet for kids

Gettysburg Address for kids
The info about the Gettysburg Address provides interesting facts and important information about this important event that occured during the presidency of the 16th President of the United States of America.

Facts about the Gettysburg Address for kids
The following fact sheet provides interesting facts about the Gettysburg Address for kids.

Civil War for Kids: Gettysburg Address Fact Sheet for kids

Facts for Kids : Facts and Information

Fact 11: President Lincoln presided at the ceremony but the main speaker was Edward Everett, a senator and preacher who spoke for more than two hours

Fact 12 : The speech starts with the words "Four score and seven years ago. " Score is a word meaning 20. Four score and seven years ago means 87 years .

Fact 13 : What was the significance of "Four score and seven years?." The Gettysburg Address was delivered in 1863. 87 years before this date was 1776 - the year of the Declaration of Independence.

Fact 14 : President Lincoln was unwell on the day of the ceremony, suffering from dizziness and a headache. It turned out that he was suffering from the early stages of smallpox.

Fact 1 5 : There are several different versions of the speech including draft copies by President Lincoln and versions published by newspaper reporters who were present at the dedication ceremony.

Fact 16 : President Lincoln's famous phrase "government of the people, by the people, for the people. " is used in the Constitution of France

Fact 17 : The opening phrase of the famous Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 1963 "I Have a Dream" speech made on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial begins in the same style referring to Lincoln with the words "Five score years ago, a great American. & quot

Fact 18 : Lincoln was asked by several people for copies of his speech. Five manuscript copies of the Gettysburg Address exist which are named for the person who received a copy from Lincoln. They are referred to as the Nicolay, Hay, Everett, Bancroft and Bliss copies.

Fact 19 : The minor differences in the copies of the Gettysburg Address account for the disparities in the number of words counted in the speech.

Fact 20 : The Gettysburg Address is regarded as one of the greatest speeches in American history.

Facts for Kids : Facts and Information : Gettysburg Address Fact Sheet for kids

Civil War for Kids: Gettysburg Address Fact Sheet

Gettysburg Address for kids - President Abraham Lincoln Video
The article on the Gettysburg Address provides an overview of one of the Important issues of his presidential term in office. The following Abraham Lincoln video will give you additional important facts and dates about the political events experienced by the 16th American President whose presidency spanned from March 4, 1861 to April 15, 1865.

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Assista o vídeo: Gettysburg: Wheatfield Fife and Drums (Junho 2022).


Comentários:

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  2. Maurits

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  3. Acwellen

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  4. Moogugis

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